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Petitioner Prosper Team, Inc. respectfully submits this Reply Brief on appeal.

ARGUMENT

Prosper Team, Inc., ("Prosper") terminated Matt Davis ("Davis") for failure to
adhere to his assigned schedule and for injury caused thereby. The parties agree that
Davis regularly deviated from his assigned schedule. This conduct was contrary to
Davis? job requirements as explained during employment orientation and reinforced
through oral and written warnings. At no time during Davis1 two-month employment at
Prosper did Prosper condone this non-conforming behavior. The question in this case is
whether Prospers verbal and written warnings are sufficient to overcome Davis1
uncorroborated testimony that he felt he could set his own schedule. Prosper asserts
that Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g), and the decision to award
benefits was arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv).

I. PROSPERS REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Workforce Appeals Board ("Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B. at

), states

that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper's Statement of Fact. Prosper responds to the
Board's supplemental facts as follows:
The Board states that Davis worked on a commission-only basis. (B. at 3). Davis
was paid commissions for sales he made but he was also entitled to minimum
wage (and overtime) when sales resulted in commissions less than minimum
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wage. (R. at 084). Davis testified that Prosper didn't like him working a lot of
overtime, (R. at 068:43), which is inconsistent with Davis being paid
commissions only. Prosper asserts that the method of compensating Davis is
largely irrelevant except the Board alleges that since Davis was paid
commissions he was "entitled to a little latitude in his schedule". (B. at 9). There
is no correlation between being paid commissions and being "entitled" to latitude
in setting one's schedule.
• Prosper agrees that "The Claimant received a schedule when he first started work
that designed to maximize client contact opportunities." (B. at 3). Prosper also
agrees with the Board that Prosper issued a written warning "outlining the
schedule the Employer expected the Claimant to work." (B. at 4)(emphasis
added). Based on these admissions, it was arbitrary or capricious for the Board
to find that Davis did not have "knowledge" of what was expected of him when
the Board states Prosper outlined the schedule Prosper "expected the Claimant to
work." (Emphasis added).
• The Board states that as a skilled sales representative Davis felt he was free to
deviate from the schedule. (B. at 4). There is no correlation between the skill of
a salesman and the right to set his or her schedule. There is nothing in the record
to establish Prosper granted skilled sales representative any greater latitude with
their schedules. Even if Prosper did allow experienced sales representatives
greater latitude, Davis only had work at Prosper for two months from March 1,
2010 to May 14, 2010.
2

The Board states that Davis believed he was free to deviate from his assigned
schedule in order to set appointments and to meet client needs. Prosper did allow
its employees limited latitude to modify their schedules based upon receiving
prior approval to do so. Approval was required because deviations from work
schedules were the exception rather than the rule. (R. at 044:16-17; 068:27-33).
Davis regularly failed to obtain the required prior approval before altering his
schedule. (R. at 050:33-34). There was no evidence that Davis modified his
schedule to in fact meet any client needs.
The Board states that Davis saw others including his supervisor deviate from
their schedules. (B. at 4). Davis admitted that he "assumed" other employees
were assigned the same schedule. (R. at 058:21). Davis1 supervisor testified that
he (the supervisor) was in fact was not assigned the same schedule. (R. at
054:11-12).
The Board states "The Claimant often left early or arrived late, yet still worked
more than 46 hours each week..." Davis did often leave early and arrive late,
however, Davis was terminated for failing to adhere to his assigned schedule not
for the number of hours he worked. The written warning issued on April 14,
2010, instructed Davis to work his assigned schedule not to work more hours.
Reciting the number of hours worked does not address Prospers injury from
Davis' disobedience, insubordination and violation of company rules.
The Board states that despite several verbal warnings, "the Employer took no
concrete action with the Claimant until it issued a written warning on April 12,
3

2010". (B. at 4). There is no legal definition of "concrete action" in an
employment setting. There is no basis in law or fact that Prosper did not take
concrete action because it issued verbal and email warnings. It is universally
accepted that verbal warnings are a form of discipline. Since the Board correctly
states that Prosper "issued several verbal warnings and expressed its
dissatisfaction through email messages,"(B. at 13), it is contrary to the weight of
the evidence to suggest that Prosper did not take "concrete action" until it issued
the formal written warning.
• Davis missed an appointment with a customer on April 12, 2010. The Board
states that "The Claimant remedied the problem, however, contacting the
customer as soon as he arrived at work." (B. at 4). Davis may have remedied his
failure to contact the customer on time, but there is no evidence Davis did or
could remedy the injury Prosper may have suffered in goodwill, trust and
customer confidence. Prosper disputes that Davis "remedied" the problem.
•

The Board states that after the April 12 warning, there is no indication that
Davis missed any other scheduled appointments. (B. at 4). A lack of testimony is
not evidence something did not occur. As Davis was terminated for failing to
adhere to his schedule, evidence of missed appointments was only one of the
consequences of his non-adherence. Prosper was not obligated to provide proof
of additional missed appointments.

4

•

The Board states Prosper "did not tell the Claimant he was being discharged for
attendance issues." (B. at 5). Prosper expressly testified "Your dismissal is based
upon attendance." (R. at 055:34).

II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISUNDERSTANDS THE
NATURE OF DAVIS1 POSITION AT PROSPER.
The Board advances that since Davis was paid commissions, Davis was
"entitled" to set his own schedule and advance his own personal interests. The Board
states:
Inasmuch as the Claimant was responsible for maximizing his personal income,
which in turn would maximize the revenue realized by the Employer, the
majority of the Board found the Claimant was entitled to manipulate his schedule
in order to meet client needs and to maximize revenue. (B. at 12) (emphasis
added).
.. .as a commission-only employee, and as an experienced salesman, the
Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in his schedule in order to better meet
clients needs and to maximize his personal income. (B. at 9)(emphasis added).
.. .Claimant was entitled to some latitude in his schedule, particularly in light of
the hours the Claimant worked each week and in light of the unique pay structure
in this instance; the Claimant was paid solely on commissions. (B at
1 l)(emphasis added).
.. .because of the commission-only structure of the job and that he had the
flexibility to schedule meetings with clients outside of the schedule outlined by
the Employer. (B. at 13)(emphasis added).
The Board appears to misunderstand the nature of Davis1 position. Davis was an
employee of Prosper, not an independent contractor of Prosper.
For purposes of minimum wage and overtime computation, the United State
Department of Labor broadly distinguishes between inside sales employees and outside
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sales employees. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
As a telephone sales representative working at Prosper's place of business, Davis was an
internal sale employee. As an inside sales employee, Davis was entitled to minimum
wage and overtime compensation when applicable. Though one may argue an outside
sales employee has a little more latitude in their schedules because they are not always
working at their employer's premises, the Board appears to go beyond the inside/outside
sales employees distinction and assert that anyone who works on commissions is
"entitled" to act similar to an independent contractor; they can set their own schedules,
advance their own interests, and choose whether to follow their employer's directions.
Such analysis is contrary to the position filled by Davis.
Though Davis was paid commissions, Davis had a schedule to adhere to, he was
expected to arrive on time, he was expected to remain at work throughout his shift, and
he was to adhere to the reasonable requests of his supervisor. Though the Board argues
that Prosper's "unique pay structure", (B. at 9; 11), entitled Davis to this latitude, there
was nothing so unique about Davis' compensation structure that "entitled" him to set his
own schedule and advance his own interests. There is not substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record to support that Davis was not an employee and thus
obligated to the same constraints as other employees. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4403(4)(g)(West 2009).

6

III. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF CULPABILITY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
The Board dedicates much of its brief to explaining why Davis? conduct was not
culpable. The Board's conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record. Grace Drilling Co., v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d
63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Board asserts that Prosper failed to establish
culpability arguing that all Prosper did was testify "that the Claimant's conduct could
potentially result in such consequences." (B. at 10)(emphasis added). By its own
admission, the Board confirms that the evidence supports a finding of culpability.
Culpability can be found by establishing that conduct could result in potential harm.
Fieeiki v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2005 UT App 398, *3, 122 P.3d 706, 707
("The culpability standard, however, does not require actual harm to the employer, but
only potential harm").

A. Davis' Conduct Resulted in Injury to Prospers Legitimate Interests.
Ignoring the Board's admission of culpability, Prosper also testified that it was
injured by Davis not adhering to the specified schedule which was designed to achieve
higher success rates and greater revenue. (R. at 048:10-11). Prosper testified that not by
not adhering to his schedule Davis missed appointments reflected poorly on Prosper and
its partners. (R. at 047:38-42; 048:3-15). Prosper testified that Davis1 actions caused "a
lack of trust from Employer to employee". (R. at 048:3-15). These are all direct injuries
caused by Davis1 actions.

7

Though the Board argues that "it is not clear how the Claimant's conduct could
have led to a loss of trust," (B. at 10), Prosper asserts that violating company rules,
engaged in insubordinate behavior, coming and going as he pleased, ignored specific
requests, missing appointments, demonstrating poor judgment, and establishing a
pattern of non-compliance are all grounds for Prosper to lose trust in Davis.
Even if the Board discount's Prosper's testimony that it lost trust in Davis, the
Department's own Rules establish that an employer's legitimate business interests
include "goodwill, efficiency, employee morale, discipline, honesty and trust". Utah
Admin. Code R994-405-207 (2010) (emphasis added). Many of these legitimate
business interests were impacted by Davis.
Davis negatively impacted Prosper's "goodwill" by engaging in behavior that
reflected poorly on Prosper and its partners (R. at 047:42-43). Prosper lost "efficiency"
due to Davis failing to work his assigned hours which were designed to maximize
contact rates. (R. at 063:5). Davis' conduct negatively impacted "employee morale" by
his coming and going in front of others. Prosper also lost trust in Davis because he
wasn't reliable. If conduct that impinges on goodwill, efficiency, discipline, morale and
trust can be disqualifying even when it occurs away from the employer's premises
during non-business hours as R994-405-207 provides, then a finding that such conduct
occurring on Prosper's premises during business hours justifies a finding that Davis'
conduct injured or could have injured Prosper's legitimate business interests. It was
contrary to the weight of evidence and arbitrary or capricious for the Board to find that
Prosper did not establish the element of culpability when Prosper establishes a loss of
8

trust, efficiency and goodwill. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(g), 63G-4-403(4)(d)
& 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009).

B. The Board admits Davis' Non-Conforming Behavior was Culpable.
The Board argues that while Prosper was no doubt frustrated with Davis, "there
is no indication in the record that the Claimant's conduct led to disciplinary problems or
undermined the Employer's authority." (B. at 10). Once again the Board's own
argument concedes culpability was established. If the record establishes that Prosper
was frustrated because Davis was not adhering to his assigned schedule, by definition,
Davis himself was a disciplinary problem and Davis himself was undermining Prosper's
authority.
The Board not only confirms that Prosper was frustrated with Davis, but in an
attempt to minimize Prosper's testimony the Board states "The Employer also failed to
provide testimony the Claimant's conduct undermined its authority other than the
Claimant was not always at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to be." (B. at
10). (Emphasis added). The Board therefore agrees that Davis was insubordinate and
disobedient by not being "always at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to
be".
In Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec., 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah App. 1988),
this Court found that the employee was repeatedly absent despite verbal and written
warnings. The employee demonstrated a disregard for the employer's attempts to bring
about a change in attitude and behavior. In finding that the element of culpability had
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been established, this Court held "that plaintiffs absenteeism was culpable conduct."
Stegen at 1163. This conclusion is consistent with the Department's Rules that "It is the
responsibility of a claimant to be punctual and remain at work within the reasonable
requirements of the employer."l Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010).
By admitting that Davis "was not always at work when Prosper expected him to
be," the Board establishes Davis engaged in conduct that was injurious or had the
potential to be injurious to Prosper. As such, the conclusion that that the element of
culpability was not established is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
the light of the whole record. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g).

C. Davis was not "Entitled" to Change his Schedule to Advance his Personal
Interests.
The Board argues that Prosper was not harmed by Davis's conduct because, as an
experienced sales representative, Davis was "entitled to manipulate his schedule" in
order to "maximize his personal income". (B. at 9; 12). The Board further argues that
the "Claimant was entitled to a little latitude" in setting his schedule (B. at 11; R. at

1

The Board cites to RKB Industrial, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2003
UT App 180 and Whipple v. Department of Workforce Serv., 2004 UT App 479 as
supporting the idea that culpability cannot by proven by tardiness or attendance
violations alone. (B. at 10-11). The Court in RKB Industrial found that the employer
was in fact not harmed by the employee's tardiness and the Whipple Court stated that
tardiness alone was insufficient to establish culpability because "the employer had
tolerated" her behavior. It is inaccurate to suggest that RKB Industrial and Whipple
establish that an employee's tardiness or absences by themselves cannot be used to
establish culpability. See Stegen v. Department of Employment Sec, 751 P.2d 1160,
1163 (Utah App. 1988). Additionally, the Department's own Rule states "a discharge
for absences or tardiness is disqualifying if the employee knew attendance rules were
being violated." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010).
10

091).2 Such an assertion is arbitrary or capricious. Prosper is unaware of nor does the
Board cite to, any law or regulation that "entitles" employees to set their own schedules
and disregard their employer's directions either because they are paid commissions or
because they are experienced. The Board was not reasonable or rational in asserting
Davis was "entitled" to such latitude because he was paid commissions or because of his
experience.
Under common-law obligations between employers and employees, an employee
owes a duty of loyalty and obedience to their employer. Jouflas v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996)(Employee was terminated for breaching
his duties, including his duty of loyalty to his employer). There is nothing in the record
to suggest that Davis was anything other than an employee. The duty of loyalty
obligated Davis to put Prosper's interests ahead of his own. The Board seems to reverse
this role and conclude that Davis was "entitled" to utilize Prosper's infrastructure,
relationships and resources to "maximize his personal income". (B. at 9, 11, 12, 13)
(emphasis added). Such a reversal of roles is not only unreasonable and irrational, but it
is also arbitrary or capricious. The conclusion that Prosper was not injured because
Davis was "entitled" to latitude in his employment to advance his own interests is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record. Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g).

2

Even if Davis was "entitled" to a little latitude, which Prosper denies, Davis'
conduct went well beyond being occasionally tardy. Davis either did not show up for
work, arrived late, or left early on May 7, May 10, May 11, May 12, May 13 and May
14. (008:Exhibit 8; 010:Exhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27).
11

D. Violation of the Department's Administrative Rules Establishes Injury or
Potential Injury.
The Board also advances the confusing argument that Davis? conduct was not
culpable under the Department's Administrative Rules because it "is not about whether
the provisions of the administrative code can be applied to Claimant." (B. at 9). The
Board seems to suggest that though Davis's actions were contrary to various Utah
Administrative Rules, such non-compliance does not mean that Prosper was injured by
his behavior. However, the element of culpability in unemployment cases does not
require a finding of actual harm, but only potential harm. Fieeiki v. Department of
Workforce Serv., 2005 UT App 398, *3, 122 P.3d 706, 707. Since the Department
Rules in question are listed under the general category of "Examples of Reasons for
Discharge" (R994-405-208), violation of the Rules can be used to establish that conduct
in violation of the standards has the potential for harm and a presumption of injury.
Were it otherwise, the Rules referenced by Prosper would not be identified as "Reasons
for Discharge".
In this case, the evidence establishes that Prosper was injured or had the potential
to be injured by Davis' conduct. The Board concedes that Davis came and when as he
pleased even after being specifically warned in writing not to do so. (B. at 5). R994405-208(1 )(d) states that "An employer has the prerogative to establish and enforce
work rules that further legitimate business interests." Prosper established that Davis
was repeatedly instructed to work his assigned schedule and to contact his supervisor if
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he needed to alter his schedule. Davis was shown to engage in culpable conduct by not
following work rules that furthered Prospers legitimate business interests.
R994-405-208(4)(2010) establishes that "An employer generally has the right to
expect lines of authority will be followed." Davis ignored verbal and written warnings
to adhere to a specific schedule. Prosper was injured or had the potential to be injured
by Davis' insubordinate conduct.
And, R994-405-208(2)(a)(2010) states that "It is the responsibility of a claimant
to be punctual and remain at work within the reasonable requirements of the employer."
Davis regularly failed to do so. (R. at 050:33-34). Prosper was injured or had the
potential to be injured by Davis missing appointments, potentially causing a loss of
goodwill with Prosper and its partners, a loss of efficiency and a loss of trust. Davis
either did not show up for work, arrived late, or left early on May 7, May 10, May 11,
May 12, May 13 and May 14. (008:Exhibit 8; OlOiExhibit 10; 043-044:23-44, 1-27). It
is appropriate to conclude that an employee that is absent, late or did not remain at work
for more than a week potentially injured his employer's efficiency and trust.
Even if the Court does not accept the Board's admission that Prosper established
injury through testimony that Davis' conduct could result in injury, Prosper testified that
it was injured when Davis did not adhere to his assigned schedule that was designed to
achieve higher success rates and greater revenue, (R. at 048:3-15), that Prosper was
injured when Davis missed appointments which reflected poorly on Prosper and its
partners, (R. at 047:38-42), and Prosper was injured when it lost trust in Davis as an
employee. (R. at 048:19). This testimony was not controverter by Davis. There is not
13

substantial evidence in light of the whole record to support the finding that the element
of "culpability" was not established. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g). Awarding
benefits was therefore arbitrary and capricious.3 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4403(4)(h)(iv).
IV. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.
Davis was issued a written warning that instructed him to "Work your scheduled
shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH 12AM-8PM, F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM". (R. at
009:Exhibit 9). Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(2)(2010) provides "A
specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the expected
conduct". Prosper not only provided a written warning consistent with R994-405202(2), but the record establishes that Prosper also issued numerous verbal warnings
and email warnings. (073:22-25). It was not reasonable or rational for the Board to
conclude Davis did not have "knowledge". Nevertheless, the Board argues that Davis
lacked "knowledge" because: (1) Davis thought his schedule was a suggestion, (2)
Prosper condoned Davis1 non-conforming behavior, and (3) Davis alleges he saw others
coming and going and he felt he was entitled to do the same. Prosper asserts that Davis

3

It is also unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious for the Board to ignore Davis?
intentional or negligent misrepresentations regarding his separation. In response to
specific inquiries about his separation, Davis reported that he had not been told to
change or improve his performance, that he had not received any warnings, that he was
not discharged for violating a company policy, and he was not discharged for attendance
problems. (R. at 012:Exhibit 12). Such disregard for the accuracy of his answers has led
others to been found guilty of committing fraud in order to obtain benefits. Ellsworth v.
Department of Workforce Serv., 2010 UT App 87.
14

"knew or should have known" of the behavior expected of him, but Davis simply chose
not to comply. See Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

A. There is no Evidence to support the Claim that the Assigned Schedule
was only a Suggestion.
Though the Board advances the argument that Davis claimed his assigned
schedule was a "suggestion", the Board fails to identify any corroborating evidence to
support Davis' claim. By contrast, Prosper's actions from Davis' first day of
employment through termination establish a consistent pattern of training, encouraging,
warning and disciplining. Such methodical and measured approach cannot be viewed as
a "suggestion" for Davis to adhere to his assigned schedule.
The Board concedes that Davis was given a work schedule when he was hired.
(B. at 12). Within the first month of employment, Davis was issued verbal and email
warnings consistent with its initial directions. (073:22-25). When the verbal and email
warnings did not change the behavior, Prosper issued Davis a written warning
specifically stating "Work your scheduled shift". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The formal
write-up also warned "Failure to correct the above actions immediately may result in
future disciplinary action up to and including termination." Id. It is illogical for Prosper
to issue Davis a written warning instructing him to work his assigned shift if it was only
a "suggestion". It is also illogical for Davis to sign a written warning for failing to
adhere to his shift if it was only a suggestion. The written warning was credible,
competent, tangible evidence that directly contradicted Davis' uncorroborated
15

testimony. If there was a lack of "knowledge" it was because Davis chose to not listen
and not because Prosper failed to communicate. Davis was regularly and repeatedly
told verbally, by email and in writing to work his assigned schedule. (R. at 009.'Exhibit
9; 48:25-36).
B. Prosper Never Condoned Davis1 Behavior
The Board suggests that though Prosper was dissatisfied and frustrated with
Davis' conduct, Prosper "condoned the Claimant's behavior". (B. at 13). This cannot be
further from the truth. The record clearly shows that Prosper issued Davis several
verbal and email warnings expressing dissatisfaction with his behavior. (R. at 048:2536). When these efforts did not result in improved behavior, Prosper issued a written
warning instructing Davis to "Work your scheduled shift of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH
12AM-8PM5 F 8AM-4PM and S 8:30 AM-1PM". (R. at 009:Exhibit 9). The warning
specifically informed Davis that failure to improve his performance could result in
termination. Id. There is nothing in the record that validates the argument that Prosper
condoned Davis1 behavior. Though the Board suggests that during Davisf last week of
employment Prosper took no further corrective action, Prosper testified that it had
"plenty of conversations" not only before the April 12 written warning "but also
between the 12th of April and May 14th." (R. at 073:22-25).
Additionally, in Law Offices of David Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review,
778 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the employee was given specific instructions
regarding appropriate behavior. Though the behavior would improve for several days it
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would to revert back to the former behavior. The Board in awarding benefits concluded
that whatever counseling the employer gave was negated by the employer's continued
acceptance of her behavior. Law Offices ofDavid Paul White at 25. The Court
"explicitly reject as not being reasonable and rational the Board's conclusion that
'whatever counseling the employer gave . . . was negated by his continued acceptance of
her behavior . . . on the basis that it does not reflect sound policy." Id. The Court agreed
with the Board's dissenting opinion that "An employer who is willing to take ample time
to work with an employee to resolve objectionable conduct ought not to be penalized
when he finally terminates the employee who demonstrates improved performance for a
period of time and then reverts again to unacceptable conduct." Id.
Here, the Board is attempting to penalize Prosper by alleging that Prosper
"condoned" Davis' conduct. It does not reflect sound policy to conclude that Prosper
"condoned" Davis' conduct when it issued numerous verbal, email and written warnings
within a two month period. It does not reflect sound policy to criticize Prosper for
failing to issue further written warnings for tardiness or absences the week Davis was
terminated. It does not reflect sound policy to conclude that Prosper "condoned" Davis'
actions because it did not fire Davis sooner. Since Davis only worked at Prosper for
two months, in light of the substantial testimony on verbal and other warnings, there is
little basis to support the claim that Prosper condoned Davis' behavior. When Prosper
methodically addressed the behavioral problem over such as short period of time, (R. at
049:6-9), Prosper should not be deemed to have "condoned" the behavior.
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Further, the Department's Rules provide that a discharge for absences or tardiness
is disqualifying if the employee knew attendance rules were being violated. R994-405208(2)(a)(2010). The written warning issued on April 14, 2010, was signed by Davis
and Davis testified that he "definitely" discussed it with his supervisor." (R. at 059:917). Davis knew or should have known he was violating an enforced rule. It was
neither reasonable for the Board to assert that Prosper condoned Davis? conduct, nor
was it rational to argue Davis did not have "knowledge" of what was expected of him.
Such conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record. Grace Drilling Co,, v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

C. Lack of "Knowledge" Cannot Be Based on a "Me Too" Justification.
The Board also advances the argument that Davis was justified not adhering to
his assigned schedule because others, including his supervisor, appeared to come and go
at different times. (R. at 058:29-31). Davis provided no witnesses that corroborated his
testimony. When challenged on his perception that others and went as they pleased,
Davis admitted that he "assumed" others were assigned the same scheduled but did not
know. (R. at 058:21-24). Similarly, Davis? supervisor specifically testified that he (the
supervisor) in fact did not work the same schedule. (R. at 054:11-12). The "me too"
justification is without merit.
It is inappropriate for the Board to find that Davis didn't have "knowledge" that
he was to adhere to a specific schedule because he "felt" he was entitled to some latitude
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based on what he perceived others were doing. (R. at 091). Davis' feelings of
entitlement do not refute competent credible evidence that Davis was repeatedly
instructed to work a specific schedule. The Board argues that Davis had been allowed to
alter his schedule without repercussions, (B. at 13-14), yet the record establishes that
Davis was frequently and consistently issued additional warnings. Prosper testified
about "frequent conversations about why he wasn't on time, why he was late, ... [n]ot
only before the 12th of April, but also between the 12th of April and May 14th, plenty of
verbal conversions." (R. at 073:22-26). Prosper also testified "Yes Your Honor, there
are things that are missing here that I failed to provide. But, yes, text messages,
conversations, plenty of other conversations that we had in regards to shift adherence
that aren't listed here." (R. at 073:16-18). Since Davis "knew or should have know" the
effect of his conduct would have on his employment, Law Offices of David Paul White
& Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), there is not
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record to support the finding that
Davis did not have "knowledge" of the conduct expected of him.4 A review of the
record establishes that Davis did know what was expected of him and the Board's
decision is arbitrary or capricious and should be reversed.

4

Even if Davis the Board is correct that Davis did not understand that he was to
adhere to his assigned schedule, Davis knew that he needed to keep in touch with his
supervisor when he altered his schedule. Davis regularly did not do. (R. at 050:18-34).
When asked if Davis knew he was to keep in contact with his supervisor, Davis testified
"Yes. That was expected." Davis' behavior of not keeping in touch with his supervisor
resulted in many of the same injuries such as loss of efficiency and loss of trust. There
is no dispute that this requirement was clearly known, injurious, and within Davis'
control.
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V. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD IGNORES PROSPERS
THOROUGH MARSHALING OF THE FACTS.
The Board argues that Prosper failed to marshal the evidence to support of its
claim that Davis was terminated for just cause. The Board asserts Prosper "marshaling
only the evidence supporting its contention that the Claimant was discharged for just
cause and ignoring any evidence contrary to its desired outcome." (B. at 6-7). Prosper
asserts it satisfactorily marshaled the evidence as found throughout its brief, including
the section specifically brief entitled Additional Marshaled Facts found at Pages 7-14.
The Board did not identify a single fact that supported the Board's decision that Prosper
did not marshal. Prosper therefore believes the Board's argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals
Board's award of unemployment benefits to Davis on the grounds the decision is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light of the whole record, the
Agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, or the decision is otherwise
arbitrary or capricious. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(d), 63G-4-403(4)(g) & 63G4-403(4)(h)(iv)(West 2009).
Respectfully submitted this ft
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